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The inauguration of a new law journal of international
economic law provides an occasion to share a few ideas about its
substantive content. One of the constituent elements of interna-
tional economic law stands a bit outside the territory of conven-
tional scholarship. This component may be referred to as such
law's "political theatre" dimension - the tendency of governments
to adopt laws and agreements that create the appearance of legal
solutions when in reality no solution has been achieved.
Normally, the term "economic law" brings to mind legal
structures that facilitate commercial transactions by providing
rational solutions to particular business problems. Scholars
writing about such law usually take it at face value. Their
scholarly criticism consists of probing for weaknesses in particular
solutions, and of looking for better answers.
In the public law of international economic law - that is, the
international law of trade agreements and the national law regulat-
ing private trade transactions - legal instruments are often created
with a somewhat different purpose in mind. The international
agreements in this area, like international agreements generally,
are frequently documents which claim to solve problems, but in
fact merely paper over conflicting national positions without
resolving them. The normal way of doing this is to create legal
documents embroidered with elegant ambiguities, but the same
result can be achieved whenever governments simply declare
divergent understandings about clear texts.
Many of the same qualities can be found in national laws
regulating international trade transactions. Legislators and other
government officials often seek to avoid choosing between
competing foreign and domestic interests by writing legislation
that papers over many points of disagreement. This is accom-
plished either by promulgating laws that issue conflicting
commands, or by writing laws that issue commands that have no
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determinable meaning at all. Government officials administering
such laws usually manage to carry out the requisite balancing act
by producing conflicting results that give something to each side.
The ephemeral quality of much of the public law in this area
often can be attributed to rather basic political behavior. To
remain in office and, better yet, to advance to higher office,
government officials need to build a record of success. In many
cases, a real and lasting success is not within reach because the
competing interests are too overpowering. In such cases, a result
that appears to be a victory has more political value than an
admission of defeat. The appearance of success keeps the official
in office in the short run. If the official does not stay in office in
the near term, the long run is immaterial.
There is, however, a less pessimistic view of this process. The
key to this gentler view is the recognition that conflicting interests
that cannot be resolved in the short run present a threat to
stability. Interest groups that cannot achieve their goals frequent-
ly will be induced to use force of one kind or another in pressing
for those ends. One way to contain such pressure is to offer the
interest group some hope of success, even if it is only a legal
instrument that has the appearance of achievement. By offering
hope one buys time, and time is often the most important element
in searching for a solution.
An agreement or law that appears to give each side what it
wants will draw both sides into a continuing process where they
try to make the legal instrument work. For a while, both sides
proceed with optimism. Invariably, of course, frustration begins
to set in as the parties realize that nothing has been solved. The
process nevertheless usually can be stretched out by repeated
attempts at reconciliation. It is surprising how often conflicting
interests will try again in this situation, which usually testifies to
the underlying desire of one or both sides to solve the problem
peacefully. Time itself sometimes supplies a way out of the
impasse as one side or the other gradually becomes accustomed to
its inevitable defeat. Alternatively, given enough time, the
circumstances underlying the friction will change and the conflict
will become inconsequential. This scenario is less than perfect,
but it is often the only one available.
Whether this sort of political theatre is noble in purpose or
otherwise, it is a very important part of the public law of interna-
tional economic affairs. Scholars of international economic law
should be prepared to deal with this phenomenon.
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To be sure, many legal scholars do very useful work that
ignores the above advice. Legal scholars traditionally have viewed
their task as supplying a coherent meaning to laws that appear
incoherent on their face. Indeed, this process of making good
sense out of nonsense may be the highest scholarly art of all.
The complete scholar of international economic law, though,
not only needs a mind open to the possibility that legal instru-
ments have no content, but also a curiosity about the underlying
forces that produce such phenomena. An appreciation of this
dimension is often the first step toward understanding what really
has happened in the international law arena, and, more important-
ly, why it has happened. Without that understanding, scholars
operate at a considerable handicap, particularly when they seek to
predict events and to prescribe solutions.
The package of international agreements that comprises the
new World Trade Organization ("WTO") contains many good
examples of the above-mentioned kind of substantive content -
or noncontent. The current fashion is to describe these new
WTO agreements as the birth of a new era - a rather heroic
advance toward the creation of a genuine international law of
economic affairs. While what has been achieved is undoubtedly
important, a more realistic appraisal is needed to understand what
has actually happened, and what is going to happen from here on
in.
A case in point is the new WTO rules on dispute settlement.
From the legal scholar's point of view, the new WTO Under-
standing on Rules and Procedures for the Settlement of Disputes
("Understanding") may well be the centerpiece of the entire WTO
enterprise. The Understanding sets forth what looks like a
quantum leap forward in the rigor and enforceability of WTO
law. Adjudication of legal complaints will now move forward
automatically at the request of the plaintiff. Legal rulings by
WTO panels and the new WTO Appellate Body will be binding
as a matter of law (unless overturned by unanimous decision).
Compliance with such rulings will be rigorously monitored, and
plaintiffs will have an incontrovertible right to retaliate in cases of
noncompliance. Moreover, Article 23 of the Understanding states
in plain language a general commitment to submit all WTO-based
legal claims to adjudication under this binding procedure.
The United States signed the Understanding, and Congress
approved it in its WTO implementing legislation. Just a few
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months after the Understanding became effective, however, the
United States set out on what looked like a flagrant violation of
the new agreement. The United States announced that it would
impose prohibitive tariffs on $6 billion worth of Japanese auto
exports to the United States if Japan did not meet several major
demands pertaining to Japanese automotive trade laws and
practices. Contrary to the requirements of the Understanding, the
United States did not propose to submit the case to WTO
adjudication, even though it did claim some WTO legal justifica-
tion for judging its claim. The dispute nevertheless was settled
with an agreement at the eleventh hour. The United States
claimed that the settlement was a victory for its muscular trade
diplomacy. On the other hand, WTO sources quickly proclaimed
the settlement a victory for the Understanding, implying that the
settlement gave the United States little more than Japan had
offered to begin with, and that the United States had actually
backed down in the face WTO legal threats.
Viewed on the surface, the story is a puzzling one. It is hard
to understand how the United States could have decided to flout
the Understanding at the very outset, and yet, having done that,
why it backed down from what looked like a popular measure.
Neither claim of victory rings true.
Looking behind the Understanding, one would have seen that
the United States was playing an extremely artful game. True, the
United States signed the Understanding, but at the same time the
U.S. Trade Representative ("USTR") also was announcing to
Congress that the Understanding would have no effect on the
robust U.S. trade policy known as section 301 - the policy
whereby the United States threatens WTO-illegal unilateral trade
retaliation against those who maintain unreasonable barriers
against U.S. trade. The USTR's statement to Congress could not
have been more contradictory, because the whole purpose of the
Understanding - and especially the commitment in Article 23 -
was to temper the U.S. section 301 trade policy. More than one
WTO delegate opined that, by agreeing to the Understanding, the
United States agreed to eliminate the WTO-illegal trade practices
of section 301. This was not what the U.S. delegates were telling
the Congress.
What was happening here? Clearly, the U.S. negotiators had
a problem. One side of the problem was the Congress. Congress
had imposed section 301 on an unwilling Executive Branch, and
it now believed the WTO-illegal threats required by section 301
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were the only part of U.S. foreign trade policy that had any value.
In recent years, every piece of major U.S. trade legislation had
contained a greater and greater commitment to section 301
practices - in 1974, 1979, 1984 and 1988.
The other side of the problem was that other WTO member
countries would not have agreed to the overall package of
Uruguay Round of GATT's trade agreements unless the United
States promised to tame section 301. These negotiating demands
placed the United States between the proverbial rock and hard
place. The U.S. negotiators could not get an Uruguay Round
agreement without promising to control section 301, and they
could not obtain congressional approval of the Uruguay Round
agreements without promising to preserve section 301 in all its
existing vigor.
The Clinton Administration did what any political animal
would have done in such a situation; it promised each side that its
demands would be met. This scenario explains the rather startling
behavior of the United States in its automobile trade dispute with
Japan. But it also explains a lot more about how the controversy
was handled, and, ultimately, about how the WTO likely will
handle such problems in the future.
The Japanese automobile trade dispute was itself a bit of
theatre played to both domestic and foreign audiences. The
threats and the claim of victory were meant to show Congress
that section 301 was alive and well under the Understanding. But,
of course, the United States did avoid an actual WTO violation by
settling the case. Was this settlement a victory for the new WTO
legal order? That depends on one's expectations. If such
expectations were based on the claim that the WTO represents a
bold new legal order in international economic affairs, the mere
fact that the United States launched this muscular threat would
have to be regarded as a profound disappointment. On the other
hand, if one understood that the United States was really forced
to straddle two inconsistent positions, the result was about as
good as could have been expected.
How will this game play out? Can such a game be sustained?
Can it ever lead to genuine resolution between the conflicting
positions?
Obviously, the stratagem would not even have been necessary
unless there had been very strong views on each side of the legal
issue represented by the Understanding. Neither Congress nor
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the other WTO member countries, however, were blind to the
nature of the scheme being played by the U.S. negotiators. Each
was aware of the other's powerful claims on the process, and each
was aware that concessions were being made to the other. Each
must have recognized, at some level, that the Understanding was
neither totally accepted nor totally rejected. Each side must have
been prepared to go forward on this basis, knowing that the other
side would have some claim to recognition of its interests.
Congress knew that the Understanding was going to be a binding
legal document signed by the Unites States, and the WTO
member nations knew that Congress was going to insist on
continued use of section 301. The fact that both sides were
willing to go forward in these circumstances is an indication that
there is some "give" in each side's position; at some level, a
recognition that some ground must be given up.
What becomes apparent, therefore, is a situation in which two
interest groups both insist on maintaining their position, and yet
recognize that something will have to be done to accommodate
the interests of the other side. When it honestly considers the
dilemma, Congress knows it cannot expect a world in which the
United States will have a totally free hand to apply its section 301
policy. Likewise, the other WTO member governments know
that they cannot expect the United States to rein in its cherished
section 301 policies until it can be assured that its just claims are
being met. In this setting, one expects that the WTO dispute
settlement procedure will earn some victories and suffer some
defeats. If the dispute settlement reforms are ever to prevail, they
will do so only through a process in which, over time, the new
dispute resolution system wins more than it loses, and in which
the momentum generated such by its victories is powerful enough
to override the negative effects of its inevitable losses.
The same observations can be made about the content of
several other parts of the WTO's foundation agreements. Many
such agreements involve a considerable glossing over of the
hardest issues. Cracks can be found in all of the major agreements
in the package, including agreements regarding agriculture,
services, intellectual property, and textiles. In no case is the real
meaning of these agreements what it appears to be. The coming
decade promises a significant number of defeats and disappoint-
ments for each of these agreements. The real question is whether
there will be enough victories to overcome them.
Anyone who watches Congress participating in the theatrical
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dimensions of the new WTO agreements would have every reason
to expect that Congress is equally adept at smoothing over interest
group conflicts in its own trade legislation, and that is indeed the
case. U.S. trade legislation is replete with protean concepts like
"subsidy," "cause," and "injury," that leave room for widely
varying interpretations. The government officials who administer
these laws have been left free to devise all sorts of inconsistent
definitions for their loosely defined concepts, and they have done
so. Although Congress occasionally corrects a result here and
there, its overall approach has been to leave its trade laws in
chaos. In confusion, everyone wins now and then.
The relatively greater force of domestic U.S. trade law will
probably invite even greater efforts by scholars to pour coherent
meaning into potentially incoherent concepts. Such endeavors are
worthwhile. But even in the domestic trade law context, it would
be beneficial to begin asking how and where the chaos originated.
Domestically, as in the international arena, the law will not
provide genuine answers to conflicts unless and until conflicting
interests are ready to receive them.
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